representationism, philosophical theory of knowledge based on the assertion that the mind perceives only mental images (representations) of material objects outside the mind, not the objects themselves.

May 22, 2000 · The aim of a representationalist theory of consciousness is to extend the treatment of intentionality to that of consciousness, showing that if intentionality is well understood in representational terms, then so can be the phenomena of consciousness in whichever sense of that fraught term.

Representative realism is the idea that our perceptions are directly caused by the intrinsic qualities of objects, and based on these perceptions we can infer things about these objects. The seventeenth century philosopher John Locke was a strong proponent of this theory.

Representationalism (also known as indirect realism) is the view that representations are the main way we access external reality. The representational theory of mind attempts to explain the nature of ideas, concepts and other mental content in contemporary philosophy of mind, cognitive science and experimental psychology.

Representationalism (also known as Representative Realism or Indirect Realism or Epistemological Dualism or the Representative Theory of Perception) is the philosophical position that the world we see in conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.

May 1, 2012 · The article gives an overview of several distinct theses demonstrating representationalism in cognitive science. Strong representationalism is the view that representational mental states have a specific form, in particular, that they are functionally characterizable relations to internal representations.

We defend first-order representationalism, which argues that consciousness consists of sensory representations directly available to the subject for action selection, belief formation, planning, etc.

Jun 21, 2023 · Representationalism is a philosophical position which reduces all phenomenal conscious states to intentional states. However, starting from the phenomenal consciousness, the phenomenal intentionality theory provides an explanation of all sorts of intentionality.

This chapter discusses the forms of representationalism, and how they might accommodate the role of the brain, and considers some objections to the basic theory of representationalism. It explains why internalist representationalism is most naturally combined with illusionism.

Representationalism, or the representational theory of perception, is a philosophical doctrine that in any act of perception, the immediate (direct) object of perception is a sense-datum that represents an external object. The latter is the mediate (indirect) object of perception.